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1 CALIFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES, 
· a California corporation, and 
THE COUNTY OF IRON, a political 












Case No. 16627 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES 
I ; ~ t 
·-;ffJ :•· i 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This Respondent specifically disagrees with the statd!Bcllu•'-" 
of the kind of case set forth in the brief of the Appellant. ' TIW • •·"' 
unmodified and unamended complaint of the plaintiff asked far~~) 
items. They are as follows: 
l. The sum of $1,320.00 for a permanent utility ease~ 
right of way over said plaintiff's property, and 
2. That the County of Iron be stopped from all future 
authorization of the use of prescriptive right of way now owned by f .. 
said County, by individuals, or private companies, for their personal 
use and profit in which the adjacent owner to said roadways is the 
owner in fee of said property, and 
l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, and 
For further relief as to the Court may seem just and : I 
While the first paragraph of the brief of Appellant in gene~ 
I 
terms attempts to deal with one of these items in its statement of 
facts, the second paragraph goes into dangerous hazards of electrocut' 
which was not touched in plaintiff's complaint, and was almost total!! 
ignored by the plaintiff in its proof. The thlrd paragraph goes into, 
expansion of the use of a easement by prescription by the defendant 
Iron County, bearing in mind that plaintiff's complaint does not ask 
for the removal of the use or the additional use put on by the County; 
in allowing the defendant California Pacific Utilities Company to buil\ 
and the questions raised in the last three paragraphs of Appellant's 
statement of the nature of the case do not properly set the questions, 
before the Court that tried this matter. To summarize the question 
of whether or not the County can increase the use of the easement by 
prescription, the plaintiff in its complaint did not ask for the removl 
of the power line and the Court very properly ruled that the plaintiff 
had no authority to raise any questions other than on the land as set 
forth in the complaint. Pertaining to the next to last paragraph in 1 
Appellant's statement of the kind of case, the question is raised 
whether or not anLabutting land owner has any course of relief for 
damage as a :xesult of a power company erecting power poles and trans· 
mission lines. Certainly this question was raised by plsintiff's 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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complaint; however, a complete examination in a very detailed manner 
of the transcript of the proceedings shows not one word of proof in 
' connection with damage. Pertaining to the last paragraph in Appellant's 
1 
I 
statement of the kind of case, this question was not raised by the 
Appellant's complaint. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed with prejudice 
and on the merits with a judgment of no cause of action entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This defendant and respondent, California Pacific Utilities, 
seeks to have the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pertaining to the statement of facts furnished by the Appellant, 
the first four paragraphs are believed by the undersigned to be sub-
stantially correct. The last paragraph is not raised by the complaint. 
While there is some testimony in the transcript at the point where 
the plaintiff was testifying personally as indicated in Appellant's 
brief to the effect that he has some dangers with irrigation pipes, 
, this question was not raised by the complaint, nor was there any prayer 
for removal, and certainly there is no question but that almost any 
line could physically be constructed in some other area. The last 
portion of this paragraph pertaining to the questions about the service 
3 
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pole, in the transcript on page 41 from line 6 to line 16, the 
plaintiff testified that the cross-arms of the two poles that actual\' 
do encroach were for his specific benefit and were there in relati~, 
to the particular operation of his and that he did not want them I 
removed. Again the complaint of the plaintiff at no point asked fol' 
removal of any item, and in line 5 of page 41 he specifically saysh 
does not want these moved. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING THAT THE COUNTY COURT AUTHORIZE PERMANENT 
INSTALLATION OF POLES AND POWER LINES OVER A 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR PUBLIC TRAVEL 
In connection with this particular point one must look at 
the history of prescriptive easements in the state of Utah, and one 
of the amazing things in Appellant's brief is the reference to other 
I 
I jurisdictions which do not have the same statutes or the same historil 
in this particular area as the state of Utah. This particular point 
has actually been ruled by the Utah Supreme Court contrary to Appell~ 
! 
brief in the case of White v. Salt Lake City, 121 U. 134, 239 P.2d 2rn 
which this Respondent believes to be controlling in this particular 
item in the state of Utah and the best source of authority in the 
above entitled matter. The similarities of these two cases, to-wit, 
the White case and the case at bar, are noteworthy. Some of the 
statutory citation in the White case have to be adjusted to the 
present statutes, but when this is done the wording is in most instani 
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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identical. In the White case, the differences are as follows: 
a~ 1. The property owner, White, owned the property on both 





2. It was a dedication by virtue of a subdivision-type 
recording. Under the old Code, Title 78-5-4, as in effect at that time, 
said, "that same shall vest the fee of such parcels of land as then 
expressed, named or intended for public uses in such county, city, or 
town for the public for the uses therein named or intended, 11 
defendant Salt Lake City had placed in the right of way a fo1111tyPei,tlit 
( 48) inch water main for the purpose of taking water on past· .a:b.1-·' 
property for the use and benefit of the residents of Salt Lalle ~ •. 
Utah proper. The section of the statute which at that time &11...i,, 
the County Commissioners to grant the franchise along the pullrbte ..,. 
er was 19-5-39 Utah Code Annotated 1943, or prior thereto, an'1 ia aa..~ 
~ry, identical with the present Title 17-5-39, Utah Code Annota~d, l9iJ..,,,,,. 
~t as amended. In the White case there was no finding of any i.t•• ia ,tJ. 
ll~ the subdivision plat by which the dedication was achieved for the ~ 
21~ 
' 
to be used for anything but a highway out in the County. 
Up until 1967 the burdens upon a public highway by pcescrif>tion 
and a public highway by dedication were identical. In either i..t..Ce 
t, ! the county or the authority concerned achieved a right of use and·upm 
abandonment the property went to the property owners on each aide to 
the middle. Title 27-12-101 still makes this provision and this has 
:~~ been upheld continually by the Utah Supreme Court. Some of the recent 
5 
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cases upholding this are Oregon Shortline Railroad Company v. Mur.!]J: 
City, 2 U. 2d, 427, 277 P.2d 798, and Fenton v. Cedar Lumber and~ 
Company, 17 U.2d 99, 404 P.2d 966, of which the undersigned has some> 
personal knowledge. Until 1967, regardless of whether a street or 
highway was acquired by deed, easement, prescriptive use, or what 
purpose, at the time of abandonment same reverted to the property 0~ 
on each side regardless of the interest that the city or county or s~ 
might have had. In 1967 the statutes were passed to the effect thati 
I 
in certain instances where the title was taken in fee, abandonment 
under some conditions may not return the property to the property 
owners. This phase of the matter is not applicable in this particuk 
instance inasmuch as Mr. Pickett's testimony showe.d that the road wa1 
' I 
there when he first went onto the property twenty years before the 
trial and was in its present condition with fences on both sides and 
there is no question of the use of the area as a public highway for 
both vehicular and livestock travel. From a practical standpoint the 
rights obtained by the County in the White case and the rights obtal~ 
by Iron County in the instant case were identical and were the rightl 
use the property for travel and purposes incidental thereto as defin« 
by our statute in case law, and upon abandonment, the properties were 
to be returned to the property owners on each side to the middle of 
the road by operation of the law. In each instance a county had acqut 
the right of use of the area for highway purposes. In the instant 
case, the right of the county to allow franchises to someone else~ 
in the instant case, the power company, for all lawful purposes upon 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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such terms and conditions and restrictions as the county may deem 
~ proper, was based upon a statutory enactment 17-5-39 Utah Code Anno-
1 tated 1953, as amended, which is the successor statute to the old 
Title 19-5-39, and is almost identical. In addition, in the White 
) case, the then Title 78-5-4 and the then Title 36-3-3 there was 
; specific authority for water mains and sewer pipes, it does not state 
1 whether these are water mains and sewer pipes of the county or of a 
1 third party such as Salt Lake City. In the White case, the rights 
of the county are set forth in detail on page 139 of Volume 121, 
Utah Reports. "As long as the dedicated street remains plated as a 
public thoroughfare the statutory provision that the fee is vested 
in the County Commissioners can only be interpreted to mean that the 
rights of the county, acting through its commissioners, are superior 
to those of the abutting property owner insofar as the normal use of 
the street is concerned." Certainly the Supreme Court of Utah, at the 
time of the White case interpreted the rights of the county in exactly 
the same fashion as the prescriptive right for a highway is concerned. 
Certainly the rights of the county where they have acquired prescriptive 
rights for a highway are superior to those of the abutting property 
owner inrofar as the normal use of the street is concerned. Under 
these conditions there can be no question in the White case and the 
instant case that the rights acquired by the county were right and 
ethical. Under these conditions there should be no question that 
the county acted properly in allowing the power company to build and 
7 
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there should be no question that the trial court did not commit error 
when it approved the installation on the prescriptive easement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN PROMULGATING PARAGRAPH 
4 OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In the first place, the statement of Point II in Appellant'~ 
I brief is not correct. Paragraph 4 of the conclusions of law does notl 
in any way use the words, "entire fee." It states specifically, "t~ 
the County of Iron has used and held the area between the fences, in· 
eluding that described in the plaintiff's complaint sufficient time 
and has established a right of way by prescriptive use of the area 
between the fences on each side of the road, including that portion I 
I 
of the area described in the plaintiff's complaint that is between I 
the fences. That this prescriptive right has been developed over, 
years by travel of all kinds on said public right of way, and the J. 
property is available by the statutory methods for all kinds of pub· 
use, including but not limited to the power line of the defendant I 
California Pacific Utilities." I 
Under these conditions paragraph 4 is a conclusions of law 
to the effect that Iron County has complied with Title 27-12-89, Ut~ 
Code Annotated 1953 as amended, and in addition has complied with 
many identical statutes prior to the 1953 revision to the effect, 
8 
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"a highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned in 
the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." This paragraph 4 amounts 
to a finding that the area between the fences has been used as a 
highway for a period in excess of ten years, and long enough to comply 
with the statute. Mr. Pickett, in his testimony, admitted he had been 
in the property for twenty years and it had been used from the time he 
has been present to the present time in this specific manner that it.· 
is now being used and was being used at the time of the filing of ·~ 
complaint and at the time of the trial, and that in additioa ha> bought 
same with knowledge of the existence of the public right of tllaf• (iee 
transcript page 37, line 9 to line 26, and transcript page 45, line 24.) 
This became a general right of passage and a highway by use, and, the. 
use extends to the fences on both sides according to the testimony •. 
There is no question from Mr. Pickett's own testimony that this has 
been used by the public for a period in excess of twenty years as 
indicated above in the transcript citation. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Pagraph 6 of the conclusions of law, which reads, "That the 
public benefit has been served by adding to the public uses on said 
prescriptive easement of the power line of the defendant California 
Pacific Utilities," is a correct statement of a conclusion of law 
based upon the findings. Certainly the plaintiff and Appellant 
should be the last to argue that this was not for the public benefit. 
9 
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He benefits from it and other people benefit from it. And really it 
is inunaterial whether anyone benefits from it or not. Undoubtedly no. 
power company is going to make an extension of plant poles without 
purpose, the purpose in the long nm is to furnish power to someone. 
I 
Plaintiff and Appellant has a well that is served by this power line, 
as well as other wells. This particular power line, together with 
the lines on which it joins on each end, not only serves the property, 
of the plaintiff, but serves other property. As indicated by the 
plaintiff, this is in a pump well area and water has to be pumped 
by the farmers that farm this area. Said water is used for irrigatiat, 
purposes. There is no question raised that this is not a lawful pil~ 
and \lllder Title 17-5-39 for the county to grant a franchise it has 
to be for a lawful purpose, there is actually no requirement for it e~ 
being for a public purpose or public use. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF OFFERED NO PROOF OF DAMAGES 
In going through the transcript in connection with this 
matter on a detailed basis, many times since same has been obtained, 
and specifically and with this point in mind, plaintiff at no time 
offered any proof of damages. The only thing that has been shown 
by the plaintiff, neither defendant had to make any defense whatsoever• 
All they had to do was to appear and stand on their answers. While 
plaintiff and Appellant is appealing on the basis that the trial co~t 
committed error, even had the trial court felt that the plaintiff's 
theory was correct, the trial court could not have granted a judgment 
10 
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for the plaintiff. The only thing that was asked for in the prayer 
0. of the complaint of the plaintiff was $1,320.00 for permanent utility 
easement. No proof was offered that this was a proper amount, and no 
proof has been offered that any damage has been done to the plaintiff. 
, Even had the Court found that the pole line was improperly placed, 
there is no basis for any award of damages in the testimony. The plain-
Y, tiff has not said he has been damaged one dollar. He has produced no 
, evidence that he has been damaged ten dollars or any other specific 
amount. The only question of damages that has been heard in this 
entire lawsuit was not an evidence item and there was not an allegation Ot; 
~ of damage in the complaint, but was simply the statement in the prayer 
where he asked for judgment for $1,320.00 for a permanent utility 
e~ easement right of way over said, plaintiff's property. As of this date 
there has been no proof. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO PROOF OF ANY AUTHORITY TO BRING ANY ACTION 
FOR OTHER LANDOWNERS IN THE COUNTY AND COURT PROPERLY 
RESTRICTED THE QUESTION TO LAND DESCRIBED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT 
This, of course, is the other question in which no proof 
was offered, and while again without any allegation of damage in the 
er• complaint or without any allegation of authority by other landowners, 
and without any allgeation that the county has in other instances 
rt allowed pole lines to be placed on rights of way, plaintiff asked that 
lhe county be stopped from allowing the statute allowing them to give 
11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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franchises in this fashion be denied availability in Iron County. 
Again the Court very properly restricted the plaintiff fro,, 
making proof or any statement in regard to pole lines in any properti 
other than that described in the complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
That the trial court acted properly in every respect in 
hearing the above entitled matter, that the plaintiff failed to 
furnish proof to support any of its allegations, that there was no 
error in law or any other item in connection with the above entitled 
matter, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this __fj__ day of --14""""'£.._...,_,_t'.:;.~..;."'-t'_,_,a'J..t:;c""'~ <!'"-'------, 19 79. I 
Respectfully submitted. 
PATRICK H. FENTO 
Attorney for Def dant and Respond~ 
California Pacific Utilities 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the __.(_.(_ day of ...i/~J~;;;....;;;c_;..--_ .
1979, the plaintiff and appellant was served with the foregoing Brie: 
by mailing two copies of same to him at P. O. Box 94, Parowan, Utah 
84761; and the defendant County of Iron was served with same by malll 
two copies to its attorney James L. Shwnate at 110 North Main, Suite• 
Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
p 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
